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11. Introduction
Do governments lose control when their countries are exposed to increasing international
integration of their economies? This paper provides some answers to this question for the
case of labour market policies in the presence of outsourcing. On a global scale, wage
differences constitute a central explanation for the increasing dominant business practice
of international outsourcing across a wide range of industries.1 In high-wage countries
with high unemployment rates due to labour market imperfections there are deep
concerns about the adverse consequences of increasing outsourcing activities.
Outsourcing, so the argument goes, threatens jobs in the home country because foreign
jobs may replace domestic jobs. Indeed, this is the case when domestic and foreign jobs
are substitutes.2 In this case, both the demand for policy intervention that protects
domestic  labour  and  the  fear  that  the  efficacy  of  labour  market  policies  shrinks  when
economic integration further increases. When direct controls are ruled out, the
government is mainly restricted to change the labour tax system or the social security
system, in particular the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme.
This paper analyzes (i) what are the effects of increased economic integration that
makes outsourcing attractive for unionized firms and (ii) whether and to which extent
outsourcing limits the efficacy of labour tax reforms with respect to domestic
employment in unionized firms that engage in outsourcing. When outsourcing and
domestic labour are substitutes, the domestic labour demand is decreasing and the wage
elasticity of domestic labour demand is increasing in the share of outsourcing (see e.g.
Senses (2006) for empirical evidence). This in turn limits the mark-up trade unions can
1 See e.g. Sinn (2007) for an overview or Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of
outsourcing. Amiti and Wei (2005) as well as Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big difference in
labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and
services to countries with low labour costs.
2 Outsourcing may be beneficial for domestic jobs when foreign jobs are complements to domestic jobs.
See Skaksen and Sörensen (2001) for a theoretical treatment and e.g. Leahy and Montagna (2000) for
empirical evidence.
2set above the opportunity cost of labour. Our paper will show that the indirect positive
effect will be stronger than the direct substitution effect. Indeed, as long as outsourcing
costs are not too small, domestic employment in outsourcing firms increases as
economic integration leads to a fall in outsourcing costs because the ease of outsourcing
disciplines the firms’ unions. This wage moderation effect, however, also affects the way
in which labour taxation affects wage setting and employment determination. This
policy-relevant issue will be discussed for two different outsourcing scenarios. Firms
may write long-term contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before the trade union
sets the wage – which we will call the case of strategic outsourcing – or  alternatively,
firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity
simultaneously with domestic labour demand after the domestic wage is set by the trade
union. We analyze how these two outsourcing strategies affect the efficacy of isolated
labour tax policy changes and of labour tax reforms that have proven as employment
enhancing in the absence of outsourcing.3 As a starting point we assume that there is a
perfect substitutability between domestic labour and outsourcing. For this case we can
show that in the presence of outsourcing both the negative effects of wage tax and
generous unemployment benefit payments on domestic labour demand and the positive
effect of tax exemption for workers on labour demand prevail but that for any given
labour demand elasticity the magnitude of changes hinges on the share of outsourcing
activities.  If  outsourcing  activities  play  an  important  role  for  the  firm,  surprisingly,  the
effect of domestic labour tax policies on domestic employment becomes stronger.
We  proceed  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  basic  structure  of  theoretical
framework and lays out the time sequences of various decisions on labour demand and
wage setting. In section 3 strategic outsourcing is presented and the effects of labour tax
instruments  and  tax  reforms  are  analyzed.  Section  4  then  analyzes  the  case  of  flexible
outsourcing. The analytical results are illustrated by some numerical simulations in
section 5. Finally, we present conclusions in section 6.
3 See, e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Koskela and Schöb (1999), (2002a), (2002b).
32. Basic framework
We first consider the case where the firm writes a long-term contract that fixes the
amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. The  time  sequence  of
decisions is then as follows. At stage 1, the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader
and fixes the two labour tax parameters. To raise revenues, the government can employ a
wage tax t, which is levied on the gross wage w, minus a tax exemption a . The tax base
per worker for the wage tax t thus equals )( aw ? .  In  the  presence  of  a  positive  tax
exemption a , the marginal tax rate t  exceeds the average tax rate )/1( wat ?  so that the
tax system is linearly progressive.4 The net-of-tax wage the worker receives is given by
tawtwn ??? )1( .
At stage 2, the firm decides about how much of labour to outsource. The firm
produces an output good with labour only, whereby, for analytical convenience,
domestic labour L  and foreign labour, i.e. outsourcing, M, are assumed to be perfect
substitutes. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate a decreasing returns-to-scale
production function in terms:
(1) ?
??
???
???
1
)(
1
)( MLMLf , 1?? .
The price of the output good is normalized to unity. Profit is given by
)()( MCwLMLf ????? , where 25.0)( cMMC ?  is a convex cost of establishing
capacity M for foreign outsourced production. This captures the idea according to which
the exploitation of the marginal cost advantages offered by production in low-wage
countries typically requires that firms make irreversible investments into the
establishment of networks of supplies in the relevant low-wage countries.
4 For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another elaboration,
see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).
4At stage 3, the monopolistic firm-level trade union sets the gross wage.5 It takes
both the tax parameters and the outsourcing decision of the firm as given and anticipates
the consequences that the wage setting will have for the domestic labour demand of its
firm in stage 4. The time sequence of these decisions is summarized in Figure 1 and the
decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. In section 5, we will
analyze the case where domestic labour demand and outsourcing are decided
simultaneously.
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
1 stagest
Tax policy
( ,  )t a, b
Outsourcing ( )M Wage setting ( )w Domestic
labor demand ( )L
2 stagend 3 stagerd 4 stageth
2.1 4th stage: labour demand
In  the  4th stage, firms hire domestic workers according to the first-order profit
maximization condition, which is wMLfLL ????? )(0 . Using the production
function (1) this leads to
(2) MwMwL ?? ??),( ,
according to which a more extensive outsourcing activity will cet. par. decrease
domestic labour demand. This feature is fully consistent with empirical evidence.6 Apart
from the direct effect, there is an additional indirect effect on domestic employment
because outsourcing also affects the wage elasticity of labour demand
(3) ? ?
??
?????
?
???
?
?????????
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1),(
1
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,,
MwL
M
MwL
w
L
wLwM w ,
5  Since tax parameters are given from the viewpoint of firms and trade unions, it does not matter whether
they bargain over gross or net-of-tax wages (see e.g. Koskela and Schöb 2002b).
6 See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2005).
5where )( MLM ???  indicates  the  share  of  the  workforce  that  is  outsourced.  In  the
absence of outsourcing this elasticity is constant, ??? ?? 0 . Domestic labour demand
becomes the more elastic the larger the share of outsourcing is, i.e. we have (using
equation (2)) 0)1/( ??????? .7 Furthermore, in the presence of outsourcing, domestic
labour demand becomes sensitive to changes in the domestic labour cost, i.e the gross
wage w. In the presence of outsourcing, the elasticity reacts positively to the wage set by
the trade union, i.e. we have (using equation (2)): 0?????
wL
M
w .
2.2 3rd stage: wage setting
We now proceed to investigate wage formation by using a monopoly trade union, which
maximizes the sum of its N members’ income that consists of the net-of-tax wage
income of employed member and some unemployment benefit payments b for those
being unemployed. From the viewpoint of a firm-level trade union b is exogenous.
Denoting the objective function of the trade union by V, the maximization problem is
(4) ? bLNLtatwV
w
)())1((max
)(
?????     s.t. MwL ?? ?? ,
from which it is straightforward to calculate the optimal wage
(5) b
t
tabw ˆ
)1()1(
)(
)1( ??
???
?
??
?? .
The comparative statics – taking into account that (5) is only an implicit function as we
know from substituting in the wage elasticity of labour demand (3) – shows first that
outsourcing leads trade unions to moderate wages because the outsourcing activity M
positively  affects  the  elasticity  of  labour  demand and  thereby  negatively  the  wage  rate
via the mark-up )1/( ??? : 0?Mw  (see  Appendix  1).  When  the  share  of  outsourcing
increases, a wage increase benefits less domestic workers for any given number of wage-
7 Senses (2006) recently provided empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the
wage elasticity of labour demand. See also Hasan et al. (2007) and Slaughter (2001).
6induced lay-offs. It is thus beneficial for the trade union to lower the wage when
outsourcing has increased exogenously.8
The  effects  of  wage  tax  and  tax  exemption  changes  on  wage  formation  are
qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing, i.e. we have 0?tw  and 0?aw ,
although the effects are smaller in absolute terms when the firm engages in outsourcing.
2.3. 2nd stage: strategic outsourcing
In the second stage, the firm maximizes profit with respect to outsourcing activities
taking  into  account  its  implication  on  the  wage  setting  of  the  trade  union  and  the
subsequent on decision on domestic labour input. From
2/)1(1 5.0)()1( cMwLML ???????? ???? , we obtain the first-order condition
0????? cMLww MM  and thus
(6) wcM ? .
Since 0?Mw , it becomes profitable for the firm to increase the outsourcing above the
level where the marginal outsourcing cost cM  equals the domestic gross wage w .
Higher outsourcing reaps an additional benefit for the firm in forcing its trade union to
lower domestic wages. Figure 2 illustrates the reasoning.
8 Egger and Egger (2003) study the impact of a decline in trade barriers on outsourcing of low-skilled
labor and find empirical evidence that outsourcing decreases wages of low-skilled labor. See also
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Hijzen et al. (2005).
7Figure 2: Strategic outsourcing in the presence of trade unions.
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When the firm increases its outsourcing activity from 0M  to 1M  in Figure 2, it replaces
the same amount of domestic workers at the given initial wage 0w , and it increases the
production cost by the trapezoid shaded in dark grey. Since this leads the trade union to
moderate wages in stage 3, it will increase total employment by )( MLd ?  and save a
domestic wage bill equal to the area shaded in light grey. The optimal outsourcing is
where the two areas are of equal size (for marginal changes). The strategic component of
outsourcing in Figure 2 is indicated by *1 MM ? . This result can be presented in
PROPOSITION 1: In the presence of a domestic firm-level trade union, the
firm will exceed its outsourcing activity beyond the level where domestic and
foreign marginal labor costs are the same.
3. Effects of labour tax policy
With  the  results  from  the  previous  section,  we  can  start  analyzing  the  impact  which
labour tax policy has on domestic employment in firms that can outsource a part of its
labor activity. Tax policy instruments affect domestic labour costs and the wage
formation directly. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that tax policy instruments
8affect the domestic workforce indirectly via the strategic outsourcing options of the
outsourcing firm in stage 3 and therefore the total employment via the induced wage rate
change and the direct replacement of domestic workers by foreign workers.
For the strategic outsourcing decisions of the firm, it is straightforward to
calculate the following qualitative results (see Appendix 1). First, we have
0????? MMMttM .  In  the  case  of  tax  exemption,  we  have 0????? MMMaaM .  A
higher wage tax increases outsourcing while a higher tax exemption for workers lowers
outsourcing activities. A more general unemployment benefit system, by contrast, makes
the domestic trade union more demanding thus increasing outsourcing
0????? MMMbbM . All these effects work via their effect on domestic gross wages. If
the domestic gross wage rises (decreases), then outsourcing activities cet. par. rise
(decrease). Increases in the domestic wage tax or the unemployment benefit payments
increase outsourcing because the domestic wage rises, while increases in the wage tax
exemption decreases outsourcing because it decreases the domestic wage.
3.1 Increased international integration
In the following, we are interested in how domestic labour market policies are affected
when the possibilities to outsource part of the workforce increase due to increased
economic integration that lowers the outsourcing cost parameter c . A lower c indicates
a higher degree of international integration, which has a wage moderating effect because
0?? cM Mwdcdw . A trade union in a firm that can engage in outsourcing will
moderate wages to alleviate the consequences of increased economic integration. By
contrast, the effect on domestic labour is not as clear-cut as might be expected:
(7) ?? ? ? 01
1 ??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
?????
??
?
MwccMw wLMMLdc
dwL
dc
dL
???
 as
1
1
????
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
? ,
where
9(8) ? ? ? ? ??????
?????
????
????
????
???
1)1(
1)1(
2)1(
)(1
2)1(
11
ML
ML
ML
wLwL wMw .
When c falls, we have the direct effect of substituting foreign labour for domestic labour.
This effect is counteracted by the indirect wage moderating effect. As it turns out, the
indirect effect may be stronger as long as the share of outsourcing is small in the sense
that 5.)1( 1 ????? ? . At 0??? M ,  we  have  a  strong  effect  of  outsourcing  on  wage
moderation, which in turn has a large effect on domestic labour because of the initially
high employment level. As the share of outsourcing increases, the wage moderating
effect decreases, i.e. 0?MMw  as  well  as  the  impact  of  wage  moderation  on  domestic
employment, i.e. 0?wwL . At 1)1( ?????  when ML ?? , direct and indirect effect are
of equal size so that in this special case, a further increase in international integration
would not affect domestic employment but a further economic integration would then
have unambiguously adverse effects on domestic employment in outsourcing firms.
PROPOSITION 2: Increasing economic integration that leads to a fall in
the outsourcing cost parameter c will moderate domestic wages set by the
union and increase domestic employment in unionized firms that engage in
outsourcing as long as the outsourcing share does not exceed the critical
value 1)1( ??? .
3.2 How single tax instruments can work on wage formation and employment
With these preliminaries, we are now prepared to analyze first the total effects the tax
policy instruments have on the wage setting by monopolistic trade unions. The total
effect consists of the direct wage effect and on the indirect effect via the impact these
instruments have on the strategic outsourcing decision of firms and thereby also on the
wage rate. This total effect shall be exemplified for a change in the wage tax rate. Here
we obtain,
10
(9) ? 0)1( ???????
??
AwA
w
wwwMww
dt
dw
t
M
t
MttMt ??? ,
where 1?A  (see Appendix 1 for details). In the presence of outsourcing the total effect
of a wage rate change on the wage setting becomes smaller as we have 0?tM Mw . A
wage increase due to an increase in the wage tax makes outsourcing more attractive. This
in turn reduces the impact the tax rate has on wage setting and lowers the benefits of a
wage increase for the trade union. Analogously, the effect of changes in the tax
exemption and unemployment benefit payments are moderated by the same factor
)1( A?  so that we have
(10) ? 0)1( ?????
??
AwMww
da
dw
aaMa ???
and
(11) ? 0)1( ?????
??
AwMww
db
dw
bbMb ??? .
Now we can determine the total effects of the wage tax and tax exemption both via the
wage  effect  and  via  the  outsourcing  effect  on  domestic  employment.  Using  (7),  we
obtain
(12) ?
?
?? ? ? 01
1
??????
??
?
?
MwttwtMw wLMwLML
dt
dwL
dt
dL .
From the first equation we can unambiguously sign the employment effect of a wage tax
increase. Employment falls when the wage tax rises. The second equation decomposes
the effect into the employment effect for a given amount of outsourcing activity M and
the effect of a change in the strategic outsourcing. Using equation (8)), we obtain
(13) twwL
dt
dL
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
as
1
1
????
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
? .
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as a condition for the direct effect of outsourcing. As long as the share of outsourcing in
the workforce is relatively small, 5.)1( 1 ????? ? , the induced outsourcing leads cet.
par. to an increase of domestic labour because, as explained above, the indirect effect via
the change in the wage elasticity is stronger as long as the share of outsourcing is small.
If the degree of outsourcing relative to domestic labour demand is high enough then the
impact of a tax reform will become stronger for any given ? . This is always the case
when more than 50 percent of the workforce is working abroad. An analogous argument
can be made for the case when the tax exemption changes. Using equation (7) we have
(14) ?? ??
? ? 01
1
??????
??
?
?
MwaawaMw wLMwLMLda
dwL
da
dL .
Employment increases when the tax exemption rises. In addition, domestic employment
is substituted for outsourced labour. The second equation isolates the strategic
outsourcing component and it becomes obvious that the magnitude of ?  (see condition
(13)) also determines whether awwLda
dL
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
. An analogous argument can be made for
the case of unemployment benefit changes.
To determine how a marginal change in the tax policy measures has an effect on
employment in terms of outsourcing costs, we have to calculate dtdcLd 2 , dtdaLd 2
and dbdcLd 2 . Formal details are shown in Appendix 1. Here it turns out that we have
no unambiguous result. When outsourcing just becomes attractive for the firm, i.e. at
0??? M , a marginal reduction of the outsourcing costs that makes outsourcing
attractive strengthens the impact tax policy measures have on domestic labour, i.e. we
have
0
0
2
?
??dtdc
Ld , 0
0
2
?
??dadc
Ld , and 0
0
2
?
??dbdc
Ld ,
because in this case we have a strong effect of outsourcing on wage moderation, which
in turn has a large effect on domestic labour because of the initially high employment
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level. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a reduced impact of marginal tax
policy changes is that outsourcing is sufficiently important in the sense that 1)1( ????? .
We  thus  have  a  non-monotonic  impact  of  strategic  outsourcing  on  the  efficacy  of  tax
policy changes. These results can be summarized in
PROPOSITION 3: In the presence of strategic outsourcing, the qualitative
effects of domestic labour market policies on domestic labour demand are the
same as in the absence of outsourcing. If the share of outsourcing is
sufficiently close to zero, the impact of domestic labour market policy
changes on domestic employment in outsourcing firms increases while, when
outsourcing activities are sufficiently large, the impact becomes smaller
when economic integration increases.
3.3 Increasing the degree of tax progression
It is often argued that increasing tax progression is good for employment. In this section,
we reanalyze this question in the presence of outsourcing by looking at a tax reform that
increases the degree of tax progression while keeping the average tax burden per worker
constant, i.e. this means that we assume
(15) at
w
tat ??
to be constant. An appropriate and intuitive way to define tax progression is to look at
the average tax rate progression (ARP), which is given by the difference between the
marginal tax rate t  and the average tax rate t a , attARP ?? . The tax system is
progressive if ARP is positive, and tax progression is increased if the difference increases
(at a given income level, see Lambert 2001, chapters 7 and 8). The government can raise
the degree of tax progression when it increases the wage tax and adjusts the tax
exemption upwards such that the average tax burden remains constant. Formally we
have, by using equations (7) and (8)
13
(16) 0
)1(
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0
?
???
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? ??
???
?
???
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? ?
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?
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? ??
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w
tat
Aw
w
taaw
da
dw
w
tat
dt
dw
w
taaw
dt
da
a
t
dta
.
First we analyze the total wage effects of this tax reform. If we raise tax progression
according to (16), we have ? ?dawdtwAdw at ??? )1( . Dividing by da  and substituting
the RHS of (15) for dtda /  gives (see Appendix 2):
(17) 0
)1(1
)()1(
0
?
??
?
??
? ??
??
?
??
? ???
?
? Aw
w
a
w
t
awwA
dt
dw
a
at
dta
.
A higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant,
will decrease the wage rate both in the presence and in the absence of outsourcing, but
the wage rate change is smaller in the case of outsourcing because 10 ?? A .
Finally, we characterize the employment effects of this tax reform. If we raise tax
progression according to (16), we have, using equations (9) and (10),
(18)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?.)1(
)1()1(
daMdtMdawdtwAL
daMLAwLdtMLAwLdL
atatw
aMawtMtw
?????
??????
The first term indicates the effect the wage rate change has on domestic employment, the
second term indicates the induced outsourcing (recall that we have 1??ML ). Dividing
(18) by dt  and substituting the RHS of (15) for dtda /  gives after some calculations (see
Appendix 3):
(19) 0
000
???
?
?
?
?? ???????? aaa dtdt
w
dt dt
dM
dt
dwL
dt
dL .
The wage moderating effect increases domestic labor demand, given the level of
outsourcing. This effect is represented by the first term. Wage moderation, in addition,
also makes it attractive to lower the outsourcing activities and replace outsourced labor
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by  domestic  labor.  Hence  both  effects  work  into  the  same  direction  so  that  tax
progression remains good for employment when firms have the opportunity to outsource
their workforces. Hence, raising tax progression according to (19) is good for
employment.
PROPOSITION 4: In the presence of strategic outsourcing, increasing the
degree of tax progression increases domestic employment.
4. Flexible outsourcing
So far we have focused on the case where the firm writes long-term contracts that fix the
amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. Alternatively, the firm may
be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity only after the wage
is set by the trade union.9 The time sequence is then as described by Figure 3.
Figure 3: Time sequence with flexible outsourcing
1 stagest
Tax policy
( ,  )t a, b
Wage setting ( )w Domestic
labor demand ( )
and outsourcing ( )
L
M
2 stagend 3 stagerd
Flexibility implies that the strategic outsourcing aspect disappears. Thus, all equilibrium
values of w, L, and M differ and this makes it difficult to compare the two equilibrium
outcomes directly. We therefore focus on the question to what extent the change in the
time sequence affects our qualitative results. In the last stage, the firm maximizes profits
with respect to L  and M . This leads to two standard results. Total employment is set
where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. This leads to a demand function
similar to equation (2), i.e. we have ???? wML . Since outsourcing is decided after the
9  See Skaksen (2004) and Braun and Scheffel (2007) who assume that the trade union sets the wage before
the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing and the level of production.
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wage is set, outsourcing has no effect on the wage setting anymore. The profit
maximizing outsourcing is thus given by
(20) wcM ? ,
instead of condition (6) that applies for the case of strategic outsourcing. As a
consequence, for any given ratio M/L, the wage elasticity becomes larger in this case, i.e.
(21) .
1)(
)(
)(
)(1
??
????????
?
???
?
???
?
??
????
??
??
wL
wM
wL
wM
c
ww
c
ww
L
wL fow
where )/( LMM ??? .  In  the  second  stage  the  trade  union  set  the  wage  taking  into
account the labour demand function as defined by
c
wwL ?? ?? . Using (21) we obtain
(22) bb
t
tabw
fo
fo
fo
fo
ˆ
12
ˆ
)1()1(
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)1( ????
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?
?
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?? .
As before, we start looking at the impact an increase in international integration ( 0?dc )
has on domestic employment. As is shown in Appendix 4, we obtain a function dcdL /
with
(23) 0
)1(
2
2
0
?
??
??
?? c
w
dc
dL , 0
2
1
2
1
??
? c
w
dc
dL
?
 and 0
2
?
?dcd
Ld .
As in the case with strategic outsourcing, an increase of economic integration has a
positive effect on domestic employment when the share of the outsourced workforce is
small but when the share increases it becomes eventually negative. Qualitatively, the
results are thus similar to the case of strategic outsourcing. At the outsourcing share
where domestic employment reaches its maximum (i.e. at 1)1( ????? ), domestic
employment continues to rise as c falls.
The analysis of changes in the wage tax, the tax exemption and unemployment
benefit payments consequently yields similar qualitative results in the case of flexible
16
outsourcing. The derivatives simplify as we do not have to take into account the
feedback effect of wage setting on the strategic outsourcing decision, i.e. we have
(24) 0
)1( 2
?
?
?????
t
abLwL
dt
dwL
dt
dL fo
w
fo
tw
fo
w
fo
,
(25) 0
1
?
?
?????
t
tLw
da
dwL
da
dL fo
w
fo
a
fo
w
fo
,
and
(26) 0
1
1 ?
?
????
t
LwL
db
dwL
db
dL fo
w
fo
bw
fo
w
fo
.
with ? ? 01 ???????? fofowfofo w .  Hence  the  signs  of  the  impact  labour  market
instruments have on employment do not change in the presence of flexible outsourcing.
This can be summarized in
PROPOSITION 5: In the presence of flexible outsourcing, the qualitative
effects of domestic labour market policies on labour are the same as in the
absence of outsourcing but lower in absolute terms.
The  analysis  of  the  tax  reform  that  keeps  the  relative  tax  burden  per  worker  constant
gives us two conditions similar to the conditions (16) and (17), namely:
(28) 0
0
?
???
?
???
? ?
???
?
???
? ??
?
?
a
t
dt w
w
tat
w
w
taaw
dt
da
a
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(29) 0
1
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a
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where 0
)1(
)1()(
2
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t
btatww
t
aww fo
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at . The increase in tax progression
lowers the domestic wage, which in turn increases domestic employment, i.e.
(30) 0
1
)(
0
?
?
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?
?
w
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t
aww
L
dt
dL
a
at
w
dt
fo
a
.
In qualitative terms, these results for the tax reform are the same as in the case of
strategic outsourcing. This can be summarized as
PROPOSITION 6: Irrespective of whether the firm determines
outsourcing before or after the wage is set, increasing the degree of tax
progression is always good for employment.
5. A numerical illustration
The analytics has shown that, initially, an increase in economic integration followed by
an increased outsourcing share has a positive effect on domestic employment because the
possibility to outsource moderates wages and this wage moderation effect outweighs the
negative impact of outsourcing on domestic employment. The analytics, however, does
not allow us to say much about the difference between the two scenarios of strategic and
flexible outsourcing. We therefore conducted a numerical simulation of the two equation
systems ((7) in the case of strategic outsourcing and A(18), Appendix 4, in the case of
flexible outsourcing) for the following parameter values, 8.?b  and 3?? , the latter
providing a cost share of labour equal to 2/3.
In Figure 4 the blue line illustrates how domestic employment and the outsourcing
share in the case of strategic outsourcing ( so ) depends on the outsourcing cost parameter c.
The red lines illustrate respective values for the case of flexible outsourcing ( fo ). As our
analytical  results  have  shown,  the  qualitative  results  are  the  same:  domestic  employment
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first rises when economic integration increases (c falls) and only eventually falls when c
becomes very small. The maximum domestic output level is reached at lower levels of c
when outsourcing is flexible, and so is the absolute level of domestic labour input. The
reason is that the impact of flexible outsourcing on labour demand elasticity is stronger than
in the case of strategic outsourcing because in the predetermined case, making domestic
labour demand more elastic is more costly as the firm has to raise M above marginal cost.
Figure 4: Numerical illustration of strategic vs. flexible outsourcing
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If outsourcing were impossible our numerical simulation model would give us a mark-up
of 50% so that the wage rate would be 2.1????cw  and 58.0????cL . In Figure 4, the
horizontal black line indicates this employment level. It turns out that even for high
values of c and thus a small outsourcing share ? , the wage moderating effect is
substantial  and  so  is  the  effect  on  domestic  employment.  For 1.?? , the wage
moderation effect is 6.0% in the case of strategic outsourcing, which results in 8.5%
more domestic employment. The respective figures for strategic outsourcing are 4.8%
and 4.2%. Only when c becomes sufficiently small, domestic employment eventually
falls. In the case of flexible outsourcing, the domestic employment level is higher for all
3.1?c  or 57.?? . In the case of strategic outsourcing, this is the case at 4.2?c  and
44.?? . These figures, although meant for illustrative purposes, indicate that in
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unionized firms outsourcing can have a very strong disciplinary effect on unions that
benefit  domestic  employment.  Simulations  on  the  magnitude  of  tax  policy  changes
indicate that increased economic integration reduces the impact of labour market policy
measures in the whole range under consideration so that these result are not reported
here.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the  outsourcing  decisions  of  unionized  firms  for  two
different scenarios. In the first scenario the firm writes long-term contracts that fix the
amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. In the second scenario, the
firm is flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously
with domestic labour demand decision only after the wage is set by the trade union. We
have shown that in both cases outsourcing leads to wage moderation, which is stronger in
the case of flexible outsourcing as the outsourcing decision makes the domestic labour
demand even more elastic. With long-term contracts the firm will outsource in order to
force trade unions to moderate wages to compensate for domestic labour payment.
It turns out that as long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too high,
the induced wage-moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct
substitution effect: domestic employment increases in unionized firms within a wide
interval of outsourcing costs when outsourcing costs fall so that international economic
integration increases. Within our framework we could identify an upper boundary for the
outsourcing share. As long as the outsourcing share does not exceed 1)1( ??? , where ?
indicates the total labour demand elasticity, domestic labour increases with outsourcing
in unionized firms.
With  respect  to  the  impact  of  labour  tax  reforms  on  such  firms,  the  qualitative
effects of changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit
payments are the same as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the
20
degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant
continues to be good for employment. Except for very small outsourcing activities,
however, the impact of these policy measures on outsourcing unionized firms’ domestic
employment are diminished when outsourcing costs fall.
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Appendix 1: wage setting, optimal strategic outsourcing and domestic employment
Comparative statics with respect to changes in outsourcing from equation (5) yields
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The first-order condition for optimal strategic outsourcing can be expressed, by using
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The differentiation of M?  with respect to domestic wage tax t , tax exemption a  and
unemployment benefit b  gives the following results:
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In a similar way we have
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Concerning the precise effects of parameters we have in terms of wage tax
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Furthermore, we have 0????? MMMccM .
To determine the impact of increased economic integration on domestic employment, we
substitute (8) in (7) and differentiating this with respect to wage tax gives
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The sign is determined by the sign of the numerator. Here we have:
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Since 0?tM , 02)1( ????? ML , and 0?tL  a sufficient, but not necessary condition
for 02 ?dtdcLd , and also for 02 ?dadcLd  and 02 ?dbdcLd  is 1)1( ????? . At
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0?M , we obtain ? ? 0)1( 2 ???? LM t  so that  at  least  for  a  very  small  share  of
outsourcing, tax policy will affect labor demand more when economic integration
increases ( 0?dc ).
Appendix 2: effect of higher tax progression on wage formation under strategic
outsourcing
Substituting the RHS of (16) for dtda /  into ? ?dawdtwAdw at ??? )1(  implies
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Appendix 3: effect of higher tax progression on domestic employment under
strategic outsourcing
Substituting the RHS of (14) for dtda / in (18) after dividing by dt gives by using 1??ML
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which can be expressed as (19).
Appendix 4: wage formation and domestic employment under flexible outsourcing
Equation (22) gives us a function ),,,( tcbaw . We then have the comparative statics for dc
and dt
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The domestic employment effect of an increase in outsourcing cost c is then
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Substituting in 0??  and 1??  yields the first two conditions of (23). Furthermore it is
straightforward to show that 02 ??dcdLd .
